PART 2

This blog is based on my own personal account of the stories and history in Alberta. When I was the Manager for the DRP I spent a lot of time reading meeting minutes from meetings that were held in the 1970s. If you have additional input or see a need to correct information please let me know and I’ll make updates. Brad

From 1989 to 2010 the DAG and the DRP served Alberta well. For the most part, it ran smoothly, mostly because the impact of disasters from 1995 to 2009 was not significant. The 2007 southern Alberta floods were bad, however, the program seemed to meet the needs of most Albertans. This was mainly due to agriculture disaster recovery being managed by the Alberta Financial Services Corporation (AFSC). AFSC was set up well to assess, decide on, and process claims. While the AFSC looked after ag operations Municipal Affairs looked after small businesses, nonprofits, and homeowners but this would change in 2010.

In very early 2010 the agriculture disaster recovery portfolio was transferred from AFSC to Municipal Affairs. It was a sudden change and one that did not transfer resources from AFSC to Municipal Affairs. I am not sure why this was the case but it was a decision that would haunt the government for many years.

Six months after the transfer in June 2010, southern Alberta was hit by some of the worst agriculture flooding in its history. There was essentially no agriculture expertise within the DRP which led to several processes and policies being developed on the fly.

In February 2011 I accepted a position at the Alberta Emergency Management Agency as Manager for the DRP. I really had no idea what I was in for. If I had known before accepting the position I might have declined it but I took the job and it was the official start to my emergency management career. 

Before my first week on the job was over I had reviewed dozens of DRP cases that were in a stage of appeal. The 1989 DAG was not positioned to serve the needs of agriculture operations, small business owners, and the overall state of many home in southern Alberta.

For many homeowners the June 2010 flood was the one event that caused massive slumping on several hills and riverbanks to give way. It was argued by the government that the deterioration of the land was already occurring pre-flood so many claims were not paid. This did not sit well with landowners.

Another thing that was not helpful at the time was the government was not willing to publish the DAG. Imagine being told that you had to follow a government policy but you were not allowed to read it and when you disagreed with a decision you were told there was no avenue for appeal. This did not go over well with rural southern Alberta land owners and rightly so. This lack of transparency and openness caused many years of grief for survivors and for the government.

Since 1995 Landlink and the government had been documenting policy decisions which would form the first public release of the DAG in 2012 which was expedited by the 2011 Slave Lake Wildfires. This was because the 1989 DAG and the current Municipal Wildfire Assistance Program did not address urban interface fires. And with Slave Lake being the disaster it was the need for the government to have a public facing disaster financial assistance policy was critical for the recovery of Slave Lake and future disasters.

You can read part 1 here

Author: Brad Ison is the founder and CEO of Hazardscape. A disaster and emergency management company that specializes in virtual reality training and coaching within its virtual 3D Hub. He’s held position specific roles in the Alberta Provincial Operations Centre and had a decade long career at the Alberta Emergency Management Agency where his focus was on Disaster Recovery and Training, Accreditation, and Standards.